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25X1

The following is an analysis of the development of public opinion  
on the present Czech government and the Council of Free Czechoslovakia  
and of the resistance movement in Czechoslovakia, particularly in  
northwest Bohemia:

1. The amount of personal data in the possession of the Communists is a very disturbing factor to the people. Most groups are known as soon as they are formed and their movements, provided they are harmless, are carefully followed. Comprehensive "live card indexes" are maintained up-to-date at the Security Departments of the Regional National Committees and probably at the party secretariats as well. Amateur party informers help to keep these cards current, and they record conversations, associations, new friendships, and other information. In addition there is a secret network of informers whose names are kept in top-secret files at the Regional National Committees and who have no knowledge of each other and pretend they are reactionaries or are being persecuted. They are probably well paid and apparently they are assigned to rural districts as well. All this results in an exchange of denunciations.
2. Important security reports are concentrated in the regional offices. Arrest warrants enclosed in sealed envelopes are handed simultaneously to several officials, both civilian and uniformed, who may open the envelopes only en route. Various traps are set also for members of the SNB to make certain of their reliability. There has been a wholesale purge of the SNB, even of persons who have been favorably received by Communist Party cadres, and they are being replaced by young, slow-thinking fanatics from the working classes.
3. In the course of extensive arrests made in the Liberec area some months ago, it was found that the resistance movement had killed one of their own men whom they had believed to be an informer.
4. Some of the trials are not even mentioned in the press. For instance, a trial was held at Novy Bydzov on 19 May 1950, when several persons were given life sentences.
5. After 20 May there was a series of incidents leading to many arrests. An explosion occurred in a kiosk of the Rude Pravo, the Communist Party official

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Approved For Release 2003/12/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R00590048000425X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 2 -

daily newspaper. A clandestine radio-transmitter was discovered, a bomb exploded at a party secretariat in Melnik or Usti where one SNB man was reported to have been killed, and files disappeared from the security office of the Vrchlabi National Committee. Consequently, alerts were intensified, road crossings were guarded by SNB men armed with automatic weapons, personal document checks on trains were made, and party secretariats were guarded by reinforced patrols of the militia. Simultaneously a wild wave of rumors spread over the country. There were reports of bombs being thrown into certain party offices and of daring exploits by parachutists like those bruited during the German occupation. As a matter of fact, whenever the militia is asked to furnish reinforced patrols to guard factories at night and to be on the alert, it is told that saboteur-parachutists have been reported. Factories display posters which warn the workers of the enemy and remind them not to divulge factory affairs to their families. As a result some workers have become quite nervous, a condition which may be attributable to material reasons rather than to ideological ones.

6. Otherwise, complete political apathy towards Communism exists. Enterprises are bullied from the top by a few political fanatics as was the case during the German protectorate. Workers have noticed, however, that it is those fanatics who profit the most materially and personally.
7. Apart from the usual administrative departments, all major industrial firms have three ideological administrative sections: cultural, security and cadre. These sections require the workers to fill out elaborate questionnaires covering such information as the "class affiliations" of their wives, brothers, sisters and parents; their previous and present political views; and their service in the army, especially with the western Czechoslovak forces. Intentionally inaccurate answers result in discharge, work in the mines, or other punishment. Obviously these sections maintain card indexes.
8. Recruitment of reliable persons for the workers' militia continues but without much success as the workers, even the Communists, are not eager to join the militia. Workers feel a sense of shame at aping the actions of the Nazis and they also fear similar future reprisals. At the same time more permanent factory guards are being recruited. Training of the militia is being intensified and commanders often have greater powers than those of the SNB.
9. Rifles are kept in safes in the plants. Weapons allocated to the Communist secretariats are distributed in small quantities to the most reliable Communists and are kept in their homes under guard, which frequently consists of as many as three SNB men. Most of the active members of the Communist youth over 16 years of age have also been given pistols.
10. The results of elections of workers' shop councils were in accordance with the wishes of the secretariats, and in many cases the chiefs of election committees were given orders on how to falsify election returns. The Stakhanovite movement is very unpopular and has achieved only disunity among the workers. Shock workers are usually selected, not because of real performance, but because of political activities, and this procedure is considered by the workers to be unfair and even ridiculous.
11. The general attitude of the people is like that in existence during the German occupation. There are the usual whispering campaigns and anti-Communist jokes, but many people do not dare risk more than these. Some exhaustion is evidenced by both the Communists and the populace. Foreign broadcasts are listened to more generally than during the war but they are not taken as seriously. The most effective broadcasts are those containing information or comments on the people at home. Any hint of appeasement evokes a feeling of depression. Recent attempts at appeasement have not been reported very frequently, to the relief of the people. Little is being done to popularize the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, and its pronouncements are therefore often not noticed. The people feel that this council is composed of too many right-wing politicians who are not quite in accord with present political developments. Politics now tend towards the left, and every party ought to consider this problem or it may lose its supporters at home.
12. Insidious propaganda is also being employed in an attempt to disparage the pre-war republic and is proving to be partly successful.\* It would therefore be desirable, provided that conditions within the Council of Free Czechoslovakia

25X1

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 3 -

permit, to set up a program to deal with this problem. A statement from the council might help to counteract this spreading dangerous psychosis. Another problem is the fear aroused by the return of the Germans to the border areas. It is likely that the position of the council in this matter may be a difficult one, but any declaration of policy to allay this fear would definitely enhance the status of the council.

13. In view of these signs of apathy and exhaustion, it is suggested that morale be bolstered by a simple and inexpensive movement covering the entire country. Some symbol like the wartime "V for Victory" or the Polish "Ancor" movement might be effective. Leaflet campaigns are useless because of the widespread listening to foreign broadcasts, and any underground group that distributes such leaflets is making a tragic mistake. It would be more useful to flood the country at a given moment with a good booklet of lasting value, perhaps one containing the program of the council in Washington. Such a booklet would of course have to be printed abroad.
14. The political parties should also make greater efforts to maintain their organizations at home despite the fact that they may be collaborating fully abroad. In this way they would not only keep their ranks closed but would also help to maintain the spirit of democracy throughout the nation. Communist propaganda touches every phase of life and by every means. Whether the people want it or not, it leaves its marks and it cannot be counteracted by foreign broadcasts alone. Communist propaganda works like the continuous drop of water that cuts rock. Moreover, it can point to the levelling influence of Communism on the social structure, which is particularly true in social and cultural matters. Therefore, the myth that the Communists hold a monopoly on social progress must be destroyed.
15. Despite the frequent trials of so-called enemies of the state and an awareness of the brutality of the police, there is less fear among the people than existed during the Nazi occupation. Only a small number of people have the character, courage and ability to risk all in active resistance. It is also more difficult to hide a person working underground than it was during the war since both sides are now more heavily infiltrated. During the war the enemy spoke German, and all Czechs were friends. Today that difference does not exist and each side is infiltrated with adherents of the other.
16. Unfortunately a large number of people have joined the Communists for personal gain. Many of them try to excuse themselves before non-Communists; these persons are found particularly in all government and local offices. About 10 percent of the population consists of ardent Communists, and another 10 percent of ardent non-Communists. Of the latter a smaller percentage is available for active resistance work.
17. Members and minor officials within the Communist Party are becoming aware of signs of a party crisis. Members are losing their enthusiasm and becoming passive. There is a growing disillusionment among some of the older, idealistic Communists, and disappointment among those whose personal ambitions have not been satisfied. This does not represent an emergence of "Titoism", of which there are very few indications.
18. Large numbers of army reservists are being continually called up for training which consists, however, almost entirely of political schooling. This schooling seems to be ineffective and many reservists are persecuted for non-conformance. For instance, one soldier was asked by the political instructor what he knew of President Gottwald. He replied that he knew nothing because in school he had learned only about Presidents Masaryk and Benes. There was no immediate reaction but in the evening his locker was searched, and when photographs of President Benes and Masaryk were found among his belongings, he was court-martialled and sentenced to eight months of rigorous imprisonment. This sentence was not published in the order of the day. Another soldier spoke (sic) to his commander, a staff captain one day, and the next day he was escorting this officer under strong guard to the prison. Political card indexes are also kept by the army. As a result of purges, the officer class is being replenished with inexperienced youths who are loyal to the party. Lieutenants are 19 years old, staff captains 26.
19. There have been reports from Moravia of regular military alerts and of construction of fortifications in the Opava region.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

25X1

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 4 -

20. The army is uninterruptedly correcting, improving and modifying the procedure for calling reservists. The latest version includes a railroad ticket. Preparations are being completed for complete mobilization even to the extent of commandeering large hotels and sanatoria for military hospitals and requiring medical personnel to agree to perform extra medical duties. Extraordinary security measures in case of mobilization have already been drawn up and sent to the regional administrations. These measures include large-scale arrests and [ ] executions to break the spirit of the resistance.
21. The more intelligent Slovaks and Czechs in the army are gradually reaching a rapport again. One reason for this is the firm anti-Communist line taken by the Czech bishops.\*\* Today the church is the only body that has succeeded in keeping up overt resistance, and the attitude of the clergy is often quite remarkable. Priests find ways to impart messages from the pulpit even in the presence of Communist observers and to belittle instructions issued by the Communist action committees. Normal church processions are forbidden on the ground that priests have no positive attitude towards popular democracy and, therefore, they cannot assure order and calm.
22. The national Sokol movement is slowing dying. The old anti-Communist members are passive since the government has taken over Sokol and they protest only by staying away from meetings.
23. The resistance of the farming population to the cooperative farms is great since the farmers are aware that the cooperatives are an intermediate means of collectivization and the last step leading to the Kolkhozes. There are six types of collective farms, the last one being the Kolkhoz. Resistance of the farmers is so firm that in the Jicin region, for example, farmers did their plowing by harnessing their cows to the plows rather than by using the tractors from the machine cooperatives. The SNB intervened by forcibly detaching the cows from the plows. Other than this type of protest the farming element has not been able to rise to any organized, high-level resistance movement. Acts of real resistance have so far been undertaken by the supporters of the Populists (the Catholic Party) and of the National Socialists (Czech Socialist or Benes' party) and to a lesser degree by the Social Democrats. There is scarcely any trace of the agrarian or tradesmen movements.
24. In the region of the Jachymov uranium mines, the free workers, in contrast to convict labor, have too much money. This they spend on drink, gambling and general dissipation which result in chaos in the work shifts.

25X1 [ ] Comment: The propaganda takes the following form: "What is the use of having all the goods you want on display in shopwindows if you cannot buy them and you are unemployed, left to starve at the slightest whim of the capitalist owners of the factories? We, the Communist government, have banned this specter from your minds." Many workers who lived through the years of depression before the war are easily influenced by such arguments.

25X1 [ ] Comment: One of the principal reasons for the rift between Czechs and Slovaks since the Communist coup is that the Slovaks are predominantly anti-Socialist as well as anti-Communist and they have, somewhat unfairly, blamed the Czechs for playing into the hands of the Communists. Nevertheless the Slovaks are also very devoted Catholics, and the anti-Communist leadership of the Czech bishops is obviously bringing the two sections of the country closer together. Other reports of a rapprochement have been received from [ ]

25X1 [ ] different areas.

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